The judicialization of politics and intergovernmental conflict in Brazil, Colombia and Spain

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain how judicial review influences the intergovernmental political dynamics in Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. The argument is developed in light of two questions: (i) How supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions for intergovernmental dispute settlement, and (ii) How national and subnational politicians use judicial reviews in order to enhance their own interests. A comparison between the judicial review processes in federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia will provide an answer to these questions. Though the selected countries present important differences among themselves that are not limited to the territorial organization, they all have common mechanisms for intergovernmental dispute settlement to initiate a process of judicial review. Accounting for the differences in territorial organizations and systems of government among these countries, the paper proposes to assess the patterns of subnational originated judicial reviews. Findings suggest that courts affect the interaction between national and subnational politicians in the three country-cases.