Standing on shaky ground : an institutional account of political instability in 'stable' Latin American countries

Abstract

In recent years political instability has spiked sharply in Mexico and Venezuela -traditionally, two of the most stable countries in Latin America-. Fueled by elite divisions, mass discontent, and armed insurrections, politics in these countries is now more umpreditable: coalitions have crumbled and consensus waned; traditional dominant parties have declined while new parties gained strength, etc. Meanwhile, actors increasingly ignore old political rules and behavioral norms to pursue objectives outside traditional channels -sometimes violently-. Behind the rise of instability is more than the usual suspects, i.e., the breakdown of elite relations, corruption, repression, or economic hardship. The turmoil also is part of an institutional dynamic linked to a shift in national development policy. This shift -from statism to neoliberalism- changed the "rules" that structured political interaction between elites, elites and the private sector, and the elites and masses. In the process, it weakened key institutional arrangements between these actors and indermined long-standing sources in both countries.